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I ncident al I nt ellect ual Propert y
BY BRIAN L. FRYE
As Mark Twain apocryphally observed, “History
doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.”{1] The history
of the right of publicity reflects a common intellectual
property rhyme. Much like copyright, the right of publicity
is an incidental intellectual property right that emerged
out of regulation. Over time, the property right gradually
detached itself from the regulation and evolved into an
independent legal doctrine.
Copyright emerged from the efforts of the
Stationers’ Company to preserve its members’ monopoly
on the publication of works of authorship. Similarly, it
can be argued the right of publicity emerged from the
efforts of bubblegum companies to preserve their monopoly
on the publication of baseball cards. In both situations,
those efforts to preserve a monopoly resulted in the
incidental creation of an intellectual property right.

of Anne was intended to revive the Stationers’ Company’s
monopoly by enabling publishers to purchase that exclusive
right. But in the process, it inadvertently created the first
modern copyright by transforming works of authorship
into a form of intangible property. Gradually, copyright
divorced itself from the regulatory monopoly it was
intended to protect, and evolved into an independent
intellectual property right, with an anti-monopoly
justification.[8]
The Right to Privacy and the Right of Publicity
Similarly, the “right of publicity,” which gives people
a property right in their name and likeness, grew out of
the “right to privacy,” which gives people an inalienable
“right to be let alone.” The right to privacy enables people
to prohibit certain uses of their name and likeness by
creating an action in tort for invasion of privacy. But it
creates a personal right, not a property right, because it
cannot be transferred and terminates at death.
By contrast, the right of publicity gives people
alienable exclusive rights in the use of their name and
likeness. The right of publicity typically enables people
to prohibit the commercial use of their name and likeness
without permission. And it creates a property right,
because it can be transferred, in whole or in part, and
may not terminate at death.[9]

A Potted History of Copyright
Today, we take copyright more or less for granted.
Modern copyright gives authors certain property rights
in their works of authorship. And most people assume
that authors are entitled to some kind of copyright
protection, even if they differ about its legitimate
justification, scope and duration.[2]
But that wasn’t always the case. Copyright hasn’t
always existed and didn’t always belong to authors.
Before the invention of the printing press in the 15th
century, copyright was irrelevant, because copying a
work of authorship was expensive, so copies were rare.
While governments censored certain works of authorship,
they largely ignored the reproduction of uncensored
works.[3]
The introduction of movable type in 1450 changed
everything. Suddenly, printers could reproduce works of
authorship relatively inexpensively, and copies of works
of authorship became increasingly common. Initially,
governments continued to focus on censorship, prohibiting
the publication of immoral and seditious works. [4] But in
1557, publishers created “copyright” by persuading
Parliament to charter the Stationers’ Company and give
its members a monopoly over censorship and publication.
And in 1662, Parliament extended that “copyright”
monopoly by passing the Licensing of the Press Act.[5]
The Licensing Act was unpopular, and in 1694,
Parliament refused to renew it, ending the monopoly.[6]
But in 1710, publishers convinced Parliament to pass the
Statute of Anne, which purported to benefit authors by
giving them an alienable exclusive right to reproduce
copies of their works of authorship.[7] In fact, the Statute

The Origins of the Right to Privacy
Today, many question the influence and relevance
of law review articles,[10] but the right to privacy was
created out of whole cloth in one of the most influential
law review articles ever written.[11] In 1890, Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis published an article titled
“The Right to Privacy” in the Harvard Law Review.[12]
At the time, the common law recognized causes of action
in tort for slander and libel, or the dissemination of false
statements that harm a person’s reputation.[13] But Warren
and Brandeis observed that true statements can also cause
harm when they improperly intrude into a person’s private
life, and they argued that the common law should recognize
a cause of action in tort for invasion of privacy in order
to prevent those harms.[14] They characterized the “right
to privacy” as “the right to be let alone,” and explained:
The design of the law must be to protect
those persons with whose affairs the
community has no legitimate concern, from
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being dragged into an undesirable and
undesired publicity and to protect all
persons, whatsoever; their position or station,
from having matters which they may
properly prefer to keep private, made public
against their will. It is the unwarranted
invasion of individual privacy which is
reprehended, and to be, so far as possible,
prevented.[15]

Proto-baseball cards appeared soon after modern
baseball became a popular sport, in the form of “cartes
de visite” and “trade cards.” Cartes de visite are small
photographs mounted on cardboard. They were invented
in 1854, and became wildly popular in the United States
during the Civil War, because they provided an inexpensive
way for soldiers and their families to exchange photographs.
But photographers also sold commercial cartes de visite
featuring assorted celebrities, including baseball players.
Trade cards are cardstock cards with an image printed
on one side and text printed on the other, used by businesses
to advertise their products and services. In the late 1860s,
as baseball became a professional sport, businesses
began using images of baseball players and teams on
their trade cards.
In the early 1870s, tobacco companies started using
cardstock to reinforce paper cigarette packages. At first,
these “cigarette cards” were blank, but in 1875, the Allen
& Ginter tobacco company of Richmond, Virginia started
using trade cards, which did double duty as advertisements.
Among other things, Allen & Ginter’s cigarette cards
featured images of baseball players, making them the
first true “baseball cards.”
Cigarette cards featuring images of baseball players
proved popular with children, so candy manufacturers
soon began using baseball cards as promotional items. In
1888, the G&B Chewing Gum Company of New York
included baseball cards in its packages of gum, and other
candy manufacturers sporadically followed suit. Between
1908 and 1915, the American Caramel Company of
Philadelphia issued several sets of baseball cards that it
sold with caramel. In 1909, the John H. Dockman &
Sons Company issued a set of baseball cards that it sold
with gum. And in 1914 and 1915, Reuck Bros. & Eckstein
of Brooklyn and Chicago, the owner of Cracker Jack,
issued unusually large sets of cards, and included one
card in each box.[24]

While Warren and Brandeis did not invent the
concept of a “right to privacy,” or even coin the phrase,
they showed how it was consistent with existing common
law doctrines.[16] In 1908, the Supreme Court of Georgia
became the first state supreme court to recognize a
common law right to privacy, and many others soon
followed.[17] And when state supreme courts declined to
recognize a common law right to privacy, state legislatures
often created a statutory right.
For example, in 1902, a teenage girl named Abigail
M. Roberson sued the Rochester Folding Box Co. and
the Franklin Mills Co. for using a lithograph of her likeness
to advertise Franklin Mills Flour.[18] The New York Court
of Appeals dismissed the lawsuit, holding that the common
law did not create a “right of privacy,” but observing that
the legislature “could very well interfere and arbitrarily
provide that no one should be permitted for his own selfish
purpose to use the picture or the name of another for
advertising purposes without his consent.”[19] In response,
the New York Legislature enacted the New York Privacy
Law of 1903, which provided that the commercial use of a
person’s name or likeness without their written consent
was both a misdemeanor and a tort.[20]
However, some courts held that the common law
right to privacy only prohibits the improper public
disclosure of private facts, and therefore does not
necessarily prohibit the commercial use of a person’s
name or likeness without permission.[21] And most courts
held that the right to privacy is an inalienable personal
right, not an assignable property right.[22] As a consequence,
the recognition of the right to privacy provided only a
qualified right to control the use of a person’s name and
likeness.

Early Baseball Cards and the Right to Privacy
These early baseball cards predated the creation of
the right to privacy, and were often created without the
permission or knowledge of the baseball players they
featured. But as courts increasingly recognized a common
law right to privacy and legislatures began to create
statutory rights to privacy, companies started to ask
baseball players for permission to use their names and
likenesses on baseball cards.
For example, between 1909 and 1911, the American
Tobacco Company (“ATC”) of Durham, North Carolina
issued the so-called “T206” series of cigarette cards
featuring 524 different baseball subjects, primarily baseball
players.[25] ATC hired sports journalists to offer baseball
players $10 for permission to use their names and

A Potted History of Baseball Cards
Baseball originated in English bat-and-ball games
dating from time immemorial. The first known reference
to “base-ball” appeared in 1744, but the term referred to
a congeries of bat-and-ball games until the mid-19th
century. In 1845, Alexander Cartwright of New York’s
Knickerbocker Club created modern baseball by codifying
the “Knickerbocker Rules,” and within a decade baseball
became the most popular sport in America.[23]
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John Robert “Johnny” Mize sued Gum in for using his
name and likeness without permission in its “Double
Play” set of baseball cards, but lost.[31]
During the Second World War, the production of
baseball cards stopped, due to wartime rationing of raw
materials. After the Second World War, the popularity of
baseball skyrocketed, and in 1948, the Bowman Gum
Company (formerly Gum, Inc.) and the Leaf Gum
Company of Chicago both issued sets of baseball cards.
Bowman signed 106 baseball players to exclusive
contracts and issued a set of 48 black and white baseball
cards. In exchange for “the ‘exclusive right to print,
publish, exhibit, display and sell’ the ballplayer's
photograph together with his name, signature or facsimile
thereof” in connection with the sale of chewing gum, the
player received $10, plus an additional $90 “if he was a
member of a major league baseball club for the first 31
days after the opening of the official baseball season.[32]
By contrast, Leaf signed baseball players to nonexclusive contracts, and issued a set of 98 color baseball
cards. At least 24 of the cards in the Leaf set depicted
baseball players who had exclusive contracts with
Bowman. Bowman sued Leaf, alleging that Leaf had
improperly interfered with its exclusive contracts, and
the parties quickly settled, with Leaf agreeing not to
issue any baseball cards until 1951.[33]
As Bowman continued to sign more baseball players
to exclusive contracts and started issuing larger sets of
baseball cards, its profits quickly increased.[34] And
competitors took notice. In 1951, the Topps Chewing
Gum Company of Brooklyn, New York entered the
baseball card business, signing contracts with baseball
players and issuing a 104 card set of baseball cards,
packaged with a caramel candy. In response, Bowman
signed its baseball players to new exclusive contracts
that covered both chewing gum and “confections.”

likenesses on its cigarette cards. While North Carolina
courts did not recognize a right to privacy at that time,
ATC distributed its cigarettes nationally, and presumably
sought explicit permission in order to avoid liability in
other states, including New York.[26]
At some point, Pittsburgh Pirates shortstop Johannes
Peter "Honus" Wagner either refused or rescinded
permission to use his name and likeness on cigarette
cards, because he “did not care to have his picture in a
package of cigarettes,” and returned his $10 fee to ATC.[27]
While ATC immediately stopped issuing Honus Wagner
cards, it had already released about 200. As a consequence
of Wagner’s belated withdrawal of permission to use his
name and likeness, the T206 Honus Wagner card is quite
rare, and is currently the most valuable baseball card in
the world, selling for as much as $2.7 million.[28]
Modern Baseball Cards
After the First World War, tobacco companies gradually
stopped issuing cigarette cards, but candy and gum
manufacturers continued to issue sets of baseball cards.
Between 1921 and 1927, the American Caramel Company
of Philadelphia issued three sets of baseball cards. But
baseball cards soon became associated with gum. In 1933,
five bubblegum companies issued sets of baseball cards
of varying sizes: The Delong Company of Chicago issued a
24-card set; George C. Miller & Company of Boston
issued a 32-card set; the Orbit Gum Co. of Chicago issued
a 60-card set; the World Wide Gum Company of
Montreal issued a 94-card set; and the Goudey Gum
Company of Boston issued a 239-card set.[29]
Miller, Delong, and Orbit did not continue making
baseball cards. But in 1934, the National Chicle Company
of Chicago entered the market, issued a 24-card “Diamond
Stars” set and an 80-card “Batter Up” set. Goudey, World
Wide, and National Chicle issued an assortment of sets
of baseball cards in 1935 and 1936. But World Wide and
National Chicle stopped making baseball cards in 1937,
leaving only Goudey.[30]
Goudey briefly dominated the baseball card business,
but in 1939, Gum, Inc. of Philadelphia entered the market,
issuing a 161-card set. Goudey and Gum competed with
each other until 1941, issuing multiple sets of baseball
cards.

Baseball Cards & the Creation of the Right of Publicity
In 1952, Bowman was purchased by Haelan
Laboratories, Inc., and Topps issued a 407 card set of
baseball cards, packaged with chewing gum. Hundreds
of the baseball players depicted in the Topps set had
signed exclusive contracts with Haelan. So Haelan sued
Topps in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, alleging unfair competition,
trademark infringement, and interference with contractual
relations. Topps responded that Haelan failed to state a
claim because under New York law the “statutory right of
privacy is personal, not assignable.”[35] In other words,
Topps argued that the baseball players could waive their
right to privacy, but could not assign it in an exclusive
contract. The district court agreed with Topps and
dismissed Haelan’s complaint, and Haelan appealed.

Modern Baseball Cards & the Right to Privacy
Before the Second World War, the baseball card
industry operated largely informally. There were few
legal disputes between baseball players and the baseball
card companies that used their names and likenesses,
possibly because the players had little or no legal leverage.
For example, in 1941, St. Louis Cardinals first baseman
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The Second Circuit reversed, holding that Haelan’s
exclusive contracts with baseball players provided not
only a release from liability for invasion of the right to
privacy, but also a promise not to provide a release to
anyone else. And the Second Circuit held that Topps
tortiously interfered with Haelan’s exclusive contracts
by inducing baseball players to breach their promise not
to provide a release from liability to anyone other than
Haelan.[36] But the Second Circuit also held that people
possess an assignable “right of publicity”:

Topps continued to issue baseball cards. In late 1953,
Connelly Containers, Inc. acquired Haelan in a merger.
And on January 20, 1956, Topps bought Haelan’s baseball
card and bubble gum business for $200,000, and became
the dominant manufacturer of baseball cards.
The Baseball Card Monopoly
Topps wasn’t satisfied with dominance, it wanted a
monopoly. After purchasing Haelan, it signed exclusive
contracts with as many major and minor league baseball
players as possible, and focused on signing minor league
players before they made the majors. The Topps form
contract “guaranteed the player a lump-sum payment of
$125 for each season in which either his picture was used
or the player was an active member of a major league club”
and “ran until Topps had made five years of payments to
the individual player.”[40] Within a few years, Topps
signed exclusive contracts with almost every professional
baseball player.
In 1965, the Federal Trade Commission filed an
antitrust action against Topps, alleging that it had
monopolized the baseball card business by forming
exclusive contracts with about 414 of 421 major league
baseball players, and “practically all minor league players
having a major league potential.”[41] While the hearing
examiner ruled against Topps, the Commission reversed,
primarily because the Topps contracts were limited to
baseball cards sold alone or in connection with gum and
candy, so competitors could sell baseball cards in
connection with other products. But the Commission
also observed that the FTC could not interfere with the
ability of baseball players to alienate their right of
publicity.[42] After the FTC decision, Topps bought out
Fleer, its only remaining competitor, and consolidated its
control of the baseball card business.[43]
In 1966, the Major League Baseball Players
Association hired Marvin Miller as its Executive Director.
Miller created a group licensing program, under which
players authorized the Players Association to negotiate
group licenses of their right of publicity, but retained the
right to negotiate individual licenses. It avoided conflict
with Topps’ exclusive contracts by explicitly excluding
publicity rights that players had already conveyed. As a
consequence, the Players Association could not negotiate
group licenses for baseball cards sold alone, or in
connection with gum or candy. The first group license
authorized Coca-Cola to put pictures of baseball players
on the underside of bottle caps. It was quite successful,
and the Players Association soon negotiated group
licenses with many other companies.[44]
The Players Association also focused on increasing
compensation under Topps’ exclusive contracts with
individual baseball players. Miller persuaded players not

We think that, in addition to and independent
of that right of privacy (which in New York
derives from statute), a man has a right in the
publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the
right to grant the exclusive privilege of
publishing his picture, and that such a grant
may validly be made ‘in gross,’ i.e., without
an accompanying transfer of a business or of
anything else. Whether it be labelled a
‘property’ right is immaterial; for here, as
often elsewhere, the tag ‘property’ simply
symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a
claim which has pecuniary worth.
This right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’
For it is common knowledge that many
prominent persons (especially actors and
ball-players), far from having their feelings
bruised through public exposure of their
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they
no longer received money for authorizing
advertisements, popularizing their
countenances, displayed in newspapers,
magazines, busses, trains and subways. This
right of publicity would usually yield them
no money unless it could be made the subject
of an exclusive grant which barred any other
advertiser from using their pictures.[37]
As a result, the Second Circuit effectively created a
new kind of intellectual property, the “right of publicity,”
which gives people an alienable right in the commercial
use of their name and likeness. After Haelan, not only
could people prevent the commercial use of their name
and likeness without their permission, but also they could
transfer the right to control the commercial use of their
name and likeness to someone else.[38]
Ironically, Haelan was a pyrrhic victory. The Second
Circuit remanded the case to the district court, where it
became clear that Haelan had failed to sign exclusive
contracts with enough players to monopolize the baseball
card business, and had bungled the renewal of many of
its contracts.[39] As a consequence, both Haelan and
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to renew their exclusive contracts with Topps, which
eventually enabled him to renegotiate the terms of Topps’
contracts. On November 18, 1968, Topps formed a new
agreement with the Players Association that “increased
the players' lump sum license payments from $125 to
$250 per year” and provided each player “a pro rata
share of 8% of Topps' sales up to four million dollars
and 10% of Topps' sales over four million.”[45]
In 1974, Fleer decided to re-enter the baseball card
business, but quickly ran afoul of Topps and the Players
Association. Fleer tried to obtain a group license to sell
large (5”x7”) patches and cards, but after consulting with
Topps, the Players Association refused. Fleer responded
by filing an antitrust action against Topps and the Players
Association in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.[46]
The district court found that Topps and the Players
Association had conspired to monopolize the baseball
card business. It observed that Fleer effectively could
not obtain individual licenses to sell baseball cards alone
or with gum or candy, because Topps had exclusive
contracts with substantially all professional baseball
players, and that it could not obtain a group license to
sell baseball cards with other products, because the Players
Association refused to negotiate one. As a result, Topps
and the Players Association exercised monopoly power
over the baseball card business. The district court awarded
only nominal damages to Fleer, but enjoined Topps from
forming or enforcing exclusive contracts with baseball
players, and ordered the Players Association to grant at
least one group license to sell baseball cards.[47]
Pursuant to the district court’s order, the Players
Association granted Fleer a non-exclusive group license
to sell baseball cards, which Fleer immediately used.[48]
Both Topps and Fleer appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Topps appealed the
judgment, and Fleer sought an expanded injunction
banning Topps from the baseball card business for one
year and forcing Topps to obtain group licenses through
the Players Association, rather than exclusive contracts
with individual baseball players. The Third Circuit
reversed the district court, holding that neither Topps’
exclusive contracts nor the Players Association’s group
licenses were unreasonable restraints of trade, and that
Fleer had failed to prove that Topps and the Players
Association actually exercised monopoly power, because
competitors could negotiate their own exclusive contracts
with individual baseball players.[49]

percentage of the value of their labor. The first labor union
representing baseball players was the Brotherhood of
Professional Base Ball Players, formed in 1885. It was
followed by the Players' Protective Association in 1900,
the Fraternity of Professional Baseball Players of America
in 1912 and the American Baseball Guild in 1946. The
prime target of all of those unions was the hated “reserve
clause,” a part of every player’s contract that gave the team
a unilateral option to renegotiate and assign the contract.
Any player who breached the reserve clause was blacklisted.
As a consequence, players were bound to their team, unless
they obtained an unconditional release.[50]
Despite the rather dubious legality of the reserve
clause, the Supreme Court repeatedly held that it did not
violate the Sherman Act, on increasingly implausible
grounds. In 1915, the owner of the Baltimore Terrapins
filed an antitrust action against the National League and
American League, alleging that they violated the Sherman
Act by conspiring to destroy the former Federal League,
but the Court held that professional baseball was exempt
from federal regulation under the Sherman Act because
it was not “interstate commerce.”[51] In 1950, George
Earl Toolson filed an antitrust action against the New
York Yankees, alleging that the reserve clause was an
improper restraint of trade under the Sherman Act, but
the Court reaffirmed its holding that professional baseball
was exempt from the Sherman Act, essentially based on
reliance.[52] And in 1970, Curtis Charles Flood, filed an
antitrust action against Major League Baseball
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn, alleging that the reserve
clause violated the Sherman Act and comparing it to
slavery. While the Court finally acknowledged that
professional baseball was indeed interstate commerce, it
nevertheless held that baseball was exempt from federal
regulation under the Sherman Act, based on the principle
of stare decisis.[53]
But the reserve clause was already on its way out.
In 1968, the Players Association had negotiated the firstever collective bargaining agreement in professional sports,
which increased the minimum salary from $6,000 to
$10,000, among other things. In 1970, it negotiated the
right for players to arbitrate grievances. In 1972, the
players went on strike and forced the owners to accept
binding arbitration. And in 1975, Dave McNally and
Andy Messersmith challenged the perpetual reserve
clause in binding arbitration and prevailed. When the
arbitrator’s decision was affirmed by the federal courts,
the reserve clause was no more.[54] Suddenly, professional
baseball players could become free agents and negotiate
their salaries independently.

The Rise and Demise of the Reserve Clause
The Players Association not only helped baseball
players claim a larger percentage of the value of their
right of publicity, but also helped them claim a larger
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Conclusion

of publicity,” a property right that enables celebrities to
do precisely the opposite.
The Stationers’ Company initially used copyright to
protect its members’ monopoly on the publication of
works of authorship, and Haelan and Topps use the right
of publicity to protect their monopoly over the publication
of baseball cards. But just as authors eventually reclaimed
copyright for themselves, so too did baseball players
eventually reclaim the right of publicity

The Stationers’ Company convinced Parliament to create
“modern copyright” in order to preserve its monopoly on
the publication of works of authorship, but inadvertently
created a new intellectual property right with an
independent, anti-monopoly justification. Likewise,
Warren and Brandeis created the “right to privacy” in
order to enable people to protect their right to be let
alone, but inadvertently enabled the creation of the “right
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